A Unified Growth Model for Independent Chile by J. Rodrigo Fuentes
*  I would like to thank José Díaz, Rolf Lüders and Gert Wagner for helpful discussions and for provid-
ing me with data. Also, I want to thank Felipe Zurita and an anonymous referee for valuable comments. 
All the remaining errors are my own. 
**  Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. E-mail address: rodrigo.fuentes@uc.cl
A unified growth model  
for independent chile*
J. rodrigo fuentes*
This article analyzes long-term patterns of growth of the Chilean economy. 
Examining 200 years of data, it shows evidence in favor of using a 
neoclassical growth model to conduct the empirical analysis. It presents 
a formal analysis of structural breaks in the Chilean growth process, 
finding structural changes in 1929 and 1971/1981. A further analysis of 
the country’s economic history indicates that fiscal policy, external shocks 
and trade policy are plausible explanations for these breaks. When these 
variables are included in the empirical model, the hypothesis of no breaks 
during these 200 years cannot be rejected.
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1.  introduction
In 2010, Chile celebrated 200 years of independence. After 200 years 
of economic history, Chile now faces a different challenge: how to 
become a developed country. This paper analyzes these 200 years from 
the perspective of long-term economic growth using formal statistical 
analysis. The goal of this research is twofold: First, to find a plausible 
theoretical model that is coherent with the data-generating process of 
the per-capita GDP and labor productivity series. Second, to examine 
the economic policies conducted over the 200 years to identify structural 
breaks in the series and common factors that underlie those breaks.
Many authors have divided Chile’s economic history into sub-periods 
marked by certain historical (economic and political) events. This 
paper, in contrast, uses statistical techniques applied to an empirical 
model derived from theory in order to identify structural breaks 
and thus define different sub-periods that characterize Chilean 
economic history. Thus, the data divides Chilean economic history 
into different episodes. A deeper analysis of those periods allows for 
the identification of policies (in the case of Chile, trade and fiscal 
policies) that are the main forces driving economic results during 
those periods. Extending the empirical model to include proxies 
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for these policies and a proxy of external shocks, we show that the 
evidence of structural breaks disappears.
The paper is developed in several steps. The first step consists of 
determining whether an exogenous or endogenous growth model is 
more suitable for explaining Chile’s process of economic growth. The 
unit root hypothesis (data generated by an endogenous growth model) 
is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis that the per-capita 
and per-worker GDP series are trend stationary with breaks. Second, 
following this evidence, the paper develops a simple neoclassical growth 
model. Its analytical solution enables an empirical specification to 
be estimated for the entire period. The Bai-Perron test suggests two 
breaks in each series: 1929 and 1971 for per-capita GDP and 1929 
and 1981 for per-worker GDP.
The third step is to identify those facts that could explain these breaks. 
The country’s economic history sheds light on the reason for these 
structural changes. Although the Great Depression appears to be the 
obvious reason for the first break, according to the literature, policy 
changes were occurring at the same time that could also explain it. 
An important question, then, is why didn’t the economy return to its 
original level after a temporary shock such as the Great Depression? 
In fact, the economy did recover from the Great Depression, but per-
capita GDP remained below the value predicted by the 1830-1930 
trend. The hypothesis of this paper is that changes in the ways in 
which the government financed spending and the orientation toward 
trade are the main causes of this situation.
Regarding the second break, numerous reforms were implemented 
in the second half of the 1970s, directly contravening the increasing 
importance of the state in the economy that had occurred from 1940 
to 1973. Again, reforms related to the role of the state and fiscal 
policy, in addition to the country’s externally oriented development 
strategy, appear to be important reasons. Interestingly, by the end 
of this third period the economy was moving closer to its long-term 
trend. The question here is whether this recovery corresponds to a 
return to the trend or suggests that the economy was moving toward 
a different long-run equilibrium altogether. This question cannot be 
answered with the available data set, but deserves further study.
The last step consists of estimating an extended model that includes 
the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, average import tariff  
and terms to trade. According to this model, the hypothesis of no 
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The paper continues as follows: Section 2 analyzes whether the evidence 
in the Chilean data favors an endogenous or exogenous growth model. 
With the results obtained, Section 3 develops a simple model with an 
analytical solution that leads to a univariate representation of per-
capita and per-worker GDP. Section 4 presents the calculation and 
analysis of the structural breaks. Section 5 discusses plausible reasons 
for the breaks. In Section 6, an extended model is estimated to take 
into account the findings in Section 5, while concluding remarks are 
presented in Section 7.
2.  A first look at the data:  
endogenous or exogenous growth
A first step toward understanding the long-run evolution of the Chilean 
economy is to analyze the data-generating process behind per-capita 
GDP. Among the important implications of economic growth theory are 
the properties of the time series of per-capita income of an economy. The 
distinction between two classes of models—exogenous or endogenous 
growth—is based on whether transitory shocks, such as a temporary 
change in the investment rate, have a permanent effect on the level 
of per-capita GDP. Another way to test this is by checking whether 
permanent shocks, such as a permanent change in the investment 
rate, have an effect on the level or growth of per-capita income. This 
has been discussed at length in literature by Jones (1995), Lau (1997, 
1999) and Kocherlakota and Yi (1997a,b).
Following Jones (1995), panel (a) in Figure 1 presents Chile’s per-capita 
GDP from 1810 to 2009 and a deterministic trend line estimated for 
the entire sample. The trend seems to fit the data relatively well, with 
a slope of 1.52%. However, a closer look reveals that the trend line 
underestimates per-capita output over the last 15 years and overestimates 
per-capita income from the post-Great Depression period until 1991. 
The Great Depression was an enormous shock to the economy, so the 
question is: If the economy were to grow at the same rate as it did 
before the Great Depression, where would it be today? The answer 
to this question can be found in panel (b) of Figure 1. A linear trend 
was estimated using data from 1830 to 1930 and extrapolated for 
the subsequent years.
1 This figure shows that under the influence 
1.  Using data from 1810 to 1930 does not change the result. The study used data from 1830, which is 
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of a significant, temporary shock such as the Great Depression, the 
economy suffered a drop in per-capita GDP which remained below 
the trend until 2008, when it reached the trend level once again. The 
long-term growth rate is 1.72%.
2
figure 1. chile, per capita gdp and long-run trend
panel (a): 1810-2009 trend
panel (b): 1810-1930 trend
Source: GDP series from Díaz et al. (2003).
2.  In a similar exercise, Jones (1995) found that a linear trend fitted for the U.S. GDP series, using the 
period 1880-1929, predicts quite well per-capita GDP in 1987.This is evidence that the growth trend did 
not change much, despite the Great Depression and the oil crisis of the 1970s.161 J.R. Fuentes | A UNIFIED GROWTH MODEL FOR INDEPENDENT CHILE
This evidence suggests the presence of a unit root in per-capita 
GDP, since a temporary shock had a permanent effect on the level 
of per-capita GDP. Alternatively, one could argue that the economy 
experienced a structural change which did not allow it to return to 
the level given by the long-term trend.
In summary, the casual evidence could be interpreted as an exogenous 
growth model with a structural change in the trend. But in panel (b) 
the evidence also seems to suggest that the data is generated by an 
endogenous growth model, with an important negative, temporary shock 
in 1930 and another positive, temporary shock in the mid-1980s. A 
more formal test of these models is presented in the following sections.
2.1. difference or trend stationary?
The type of model used to explain the long-term performance of 
Chile’s economy depends fundamentally on the data-generating process 
behind the per-capita GDP series. One of the attractive features of 
growth theory is that the implications of endogenous and exogenous 
growth models can easily be tested. Lau (1997, 1999) shows that a 
data-generating process for per-capita GDP that is consistent with 
endogenous growth models should be integrated of order 1. Unfortunately, 
the tests available are not powerful enough to completely discriminate 
between models; however, this is not a sufficiently strong argument 
not to proceed in applying them. Rejecting the null hypothesis of 
unit root lends support to the claim that an exogenous growth model 
could explain the evolution of per-capita GDP.
Chumacero and Fuentes (2006a) analyze the characteristics of the 
time series of per-capita GDP for 1810-1995 and find no evidence of 
unit root. This analysis is applied here using an additional 15 years 
of data. The traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the 
null of unit root (see Table 1). On the other hand, the Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test cannot reject the null that 
the series is trend stationary against the alternative of unit root. The 
Elliot Rothenberg and Stock (ERS) test is the only one that favors 
the null of unit root in the per-capita GDP series but not in the labor 
productivity series. More powerful tests such as the one developed 
by Ng and Perron (2001) also reject the unit root hypothesis. Zivot 
and Andrews (1992) develop a unit root test where the alternative 
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in the level or the trend. The advantage of this test is that the break 
is endogenously determined by the data. As expected for such a long 
series, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected.
The univariate analysis of the data tends to indicate that both per-capita 
and per-worker GDP are trend stationary. However, the evidence also 
points in the direction of a structural break in the series. The latter 
hypothesis is analyzed in the following section, using a more formal model.
table 1. unit root tests 
test h0 gdp/pop gdp/l
ADF It has a unit root NO* NO*
KPSS It is stationary YES YES
ERS It has a unit root YES NO*
Ng and Perron It has a unit root YES YES
ZA (level) It has a unit root NO*** NO***
ZA (trend) It has a unit root NO*** NO***
Note: No = the null hypothesis is rejected at a significance level of 1 (***), 5 (**) or 10 (*) percent.
3.  A neoclassical growth model
In this section a simple version of the neoclassical model is examined. 
One of the main features of the model is the ability to generate trend 
stationary series of per-capita GDP. In order to have a closed-form 
solution, the model assumes preferences with a constant relative risk 
aversion equal to one and a Cobb-Douglas production function in a 











where 0 < b < 1 is the subjective discount factor, Lt is the size of 




3 and Et is the expectation operator depending on 
information available at period t. The household supplies inelastically 
3.  Lower-case letters denote per capita; upper-case total; and a tilde above a variable denotes per unit 
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Lt units of labor. Utility is maximized with respect to per-capita 
consumption, subject to the following budget constraint:





















where Kt is the capital stock at time t, δ is the depreciation rate, and 
a is the compensation for capital as a share of GDP. In this economy, 
technological progress is labor-augmenting and occurs at the constant 
rate g. Production is affected by a stationary productivity shock zt. 
It is possible to rewrite the model in terms of effective unit of labor,   
￿ g () =+ kk /1 tt
t
 and ￿ g () =+ cc /1 tt
t
 which makes ￿ kt and ￿ ct stationary. 
The solution of the stationary economy is the same as the above 
economy. This economy is characterized by the following problem:
￿
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where n is the rate of population growth, which is assumed constant. 
The stochastic process for the technology shock is given by:
∼ N ρε εσ () =+ ε − zz ,0 ,. tt t 1t
2   (3)
Assuming δ = 1, the analytical solution of this problem is the policy 
function for the capital per effective unit of labor expressed as:
￿ ￿ αβ γ () () =− +− ++ + k n y ln ln ln 1l n(1) ln t t 1   (4)
where ￿ ￿ =
a ye k tt
z
t
t  is the GDP per unit of effective labor.
Given that  ￿ y ln t can be expressed as:
￿ ￿ a =+ yz k ln ln tt t   (5)164 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 157–179
we can replace (3) and (4) in (5) to obtain:
￿ ￿ ￿ αρ αρ ε () =+ +− + − − yA yy ln ln ln t t tt 1 2    (6)
where  αραβ λ () () () =− −+ 


 A 1l nl n1  . Recalling that ￿ λ () += yy 1 t
t
t 
we can use (6) to obtain a compact representation of the data-generating 
process of per capita GDP:
φφ αρ αρ ε () =+++ −+ − − yt yy ln ln ln , t t tt 01 1 2    (7)
where φ0 ≡ A, φ1 ≡ ln(1 + g), φ2 ≡ a + ρ, and φ3 ≡ -aρ. Equation (7) 
is consistent with a series of per-capita GDP that is trend stationary 
as found in the data. Moreover, it shows that per-capita GDP follows 
an AR(2) process if the technology shock follows an AR(1) process. 
This equation includes as a special case the traditional AK model 
(a = 1) and the unit root in the technology process (ρ = 1), but it is 
impossible to identify the value of any of these parameters.
4.  Searching for breaks in the univariate 
representation
This section is divided into two parts. First, following the guidelines 
of the neoclassical growth model developed in the previous section, 
a univariate representation for GDP is estimated. Second, structural 
break tests are applied to the model to check for eventual nonlinearities 
or omitted variable problems. The analysis of the structural changes 
based on Chile’s economic history is provided in the next section.
Table 2 exhibits the least-squares estimation of (7). The model in the 
previous section is parsimonious and therefore it is valid to ask whether 
an AR(2) process for per-capita GDP is enough to obtain parameters 
with the desired properties. However, the results show that two lags of 
the dependent variable are sufficient to obtain white noise residuals. 
But there is evidence of auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity, 
and of the residuals not being distributed normally. This may suggest 
that other variables are missing from the analysis. The long-term trend 
in the growth rate is given by φ1/(1-φ2-φ3), which is equal to 1.6 
percent, corresponding to the average growth rate of per-capita GDP 
over the entire period. The coefficients estimated are very similar for 
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capita GDP or per-worker GDP. Also, the sample is different for each 
equation, since there are no data on per-worker GDP before 1833.
It is difficult to believe that a stylized model such as the one presented 
here could explain the long-term growth process over 200 years without 
evidence of structural changes. Moreover, the Zivot and Andrews test 
presented in the previous section rejects the null hypothesis of unit 
root in favor of stationarity in the series of per-capita GDP with a 
break. Numerous events could lead to structural changes at different 
moments in time; therefore, it is hard to date the structural breaks. 
The Chow test is not appropriate in this situation because it requires 
knowing in advance when the breaks did occur.































Q (p-value) 0.470 0.471
Q2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
JB 0.000 0.000
Notes: DW = Durbin-Watson statistic. Q = Minimum p-value of the Ljung-Box test for white noise in 
the residuals. Q2 = Minimum p-value of the Ljung-Box test for white noise in the squared residuals. 
JB = p-value of the Jarque-Bera normality test. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2001) derive several tests for multiple structural 
breaks in linear models, such that the date of the break is not imposed 
by the researcher but is endogenously determined by the data. Table 3 
shows the result of the Bai-Perron test for each equation presented 
in Table 2. The UDmax test rejects the null hypothesis of no break 166 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 157–179
against the alternative of an unknown number of breaks, while SupFt(1) 
rejects the null in favor of the alternative of one break. Bai and Perron 
also developed a sequential break test to determine the number of 
breaks. SupF(j + 1 = j) tests the null hypothesis of j breaks against 
the alternative of j + 1 breaks. For both variables, per-capita and per-
worker GDP, the SupF(2/1) test cannot reject the null of two breaks, 
but SupF(3/2) rejects the null of three breaks. The bottom row shows 
the most likely dates of the breaks. For both equations, there is clearly 
a break in 1929, the year the Great Depression began. Surprisingly, the 
second break shows a 10-year difference between the two models: 1971 
for per-capita GDP and 1981 for per-worker GDP. We do not have a 
plausible explanation for this difference, but there are two elements 
worth noting. First, there is a confidence interval for the date of the 
break, which is [1969, 1973] for the per-capita GDP series and [1979, 
1983] for the per-worker GDP series. These intervals do not overlap, 
which suggests that the dates are statistically significant. Second, there 
was a large difference in the unemployment rate (5.2% in 1971 and 
15.5% in 1981), which could explain the significant difference between 
the dates of the breaks for these two series.
table 3.  Bai-perron test for structural breaks 
per-capita gdp per-worker gdp
SupFt(1) UDmax SupFt(1) UDmax
26.80** 34.16** 33.07** 40.96**
SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2) SupF(2/1) SupF(3/2)
36.03** 8.25 40.72** 5.5
Dates 1929, 1971 Dates 1929, 1981
Notes: The first row shows the results of the test of no break against one break. SupF(i/j) is the 
value of the test of i breaks against j breaks. Row dates indicate the most likely date for the breaks. 
Significant at the 1 (***), 5 (**) or 10 (*) percent levels. 
The next step is to estimate Equation (7) for each sub-period identified 
by the Bai-Perron test; the results are shown in Table 4. Notably, 
the persistence parameters (φ2 and φ3) and the instantaneous growth 
rate (φ1) vary across different time periods.
4 The bottom part of the 
4.  Recall that φ2 and φ3 are combinations of the capital share and the persistence of the shocks, but 
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Table presents the implied long-term growth rate for each period. 
The first period shows the lowest growth rate of both per-capita GDP 
and per-worker GDP. The second period, which ends in a different 
year for each variable, exhibits a slightly higher growth rate than the 
first one. This analysis suggests that the shock associated with the 
Great Depression had a considerable impact on the level of per-capita 
GDP but a small effect on the growth rate. It is also notable that 
the instantaneous growth rate (φ1) increased more during the second 
period compared to the first one (1.2% compared to 0.5%), but the 
persistence, specifically φ3, changed in a way that reduced the long-
term growth rate. In the last period (1972-2009 for per-capita GDP 
and 1982-2009 for per-worker GDP), Chile showed the fastest growth 
in its economic history. Per-capita GDP grew at 3.4% while labor 
productivity increased by 2.7% per annum, which is remarkably high 
compared to any other time period. The next step is to look at the 
main events or processes in Chilean economic history to find plausible 
explanations for these structural changes.
table 4A. univariate time series model under each regime
per-capita gdp per-worker gdp























































1810-1929 1930-1971 1972-2009 1810-1929 1930-1981 1982-2009
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5.  delving deeper into the breaks
This section discusses historical episodes that could justify the 
structural breaks described in the previous section. There is an extensive 
body of literature that points to certain common factors such as 
trade regimes and government behavior to explain Chile’s economic 
performance (Cariola and Sunkel, 1990; Meller, 1996; Lüders, 1998, 
and the references therein). Following these authors, we can define 
the episodes as a function of the orientation toward foreign trade 
and the government’s role in the economy. In addition, the Chilean 
economy has been always dependent on natural resources, particularly 
minerals. Therefore, the relative price of these commodities may play 
an important role in shaping the country’s economic performance. 
Table 5 summarizes the key features in these dimensions for the 
three periods defined in the previous section. The first period is 
1833-1929, in which the growth rates of per-capita GDP and per-
worker GDP were 1.8 and 1.9%, respectively. During this period 
the young republic began trading with new partners; prior to that, 
international trade had largely been limited to Spain. Chile’s main 
exports were minerals (silver and copper before 1879, and nitrate 
after the War of the Pacific) and agricultural products (exported 
mainly to Australia and California in the mid-19th century). During 
the second period, after the Great Depression, the economy began 
a process of import substitution with an expanded state role in 
economic activity: government intervention peaked between 1971 
and 1973. After 1974, the economy transitioned toward a free-trade 
model with limited state participation in economic activity, which 
Lüders (1998) refers to as a subsidiary role of the state.
table 5. features of chilean economic history
features 1833-1929 1930-1981 1982-2009
NR- dependence Silver, Nitrate, 
Copper Copper Copper












Growth rate of per-capita GDP 1.77% 1.86% 3.43%
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It may be too simplistic to consider that only these features are 
relevant to understanding the growth process. However, the goal is to 
verify whether an examination of this element can explain structural 
changes in the evolution of per-capita GDP. Although there may be 
many significant historical episodes, here only those defined by the 
structural breaks are studied.
5.1. first structural change: 1929
The first break takes place in 1929. As mentioned by Lüders and 
Wagner (2003a), the Great Depression is viewed as a natural event 
that divided the economic history of the Western world. This is called 
the defining moment hypothesis.
There is little doubt that the Great Depression coincided with significant 
institutional and policy changes around the world, and particularly 
in Chile. However, that coincidence could be wrongly interpreted as 
causality. In the case of Chile, Lüders and Wagner (2003a) question 
this hypothesis on the grounds that the most important economic 
events took place before the Great Depression. For instance, the 
state’s increasingly active role in the economy commenced in the 
1920s with more market regulations and a higher tax burden. Before 
the Great Depression, Chile’s terms of trade had begun collapsing 
with the invention of artificial nitrate, which replaced natural nitrate 
due to its lower price. By the early 1920s, nitrate prices were already 
low; the crisis merely deepened the drop in terms of trade. This event 
triggered the increasing protectionism observed in the 1930s, but does 
not explain the further increase in protectionism experienced by the 
country in the following decades.
Another important consequence (perhaps the most important) of the 
fall in exports was a decline in tax collection. According to evidence 
presented by Humud (1974), government expenditures were mainly 
financed by taxes on international trade (export and import taxes), 
revenue from state-owned firms and to a lesser extent by internal 
taxes. Changes in taxes on international trade occurred along with 
the emergence of new interest groups, which in the early days of the 
republic sought monopoly power in certain activities. In addition, 
the mercantilist view—popular at the time—led the government to 
impose relatively high import tariffs. As export activities became 
increasingly important, landowners and mine owners applied pressure 
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had been more important than export taxes, after that time export 
taxes became the main source of customs revenues (Humud, 1974).
Chile became particularly dependent on export taxes after the War 
of the Pacific, which resulted in Chile taking control of the nitrate-
rich Tarapacá and Antofagasta regions. The domestic tax burden was 
relatively low, as the government financed its budget with export 
taxes (Díaz et al., 2003; Lüders and Wagner, 2003b). This may have 
been optimal from the point of view of the Chilean economy, given 
the country’s monopoly power in the international nitrate market. 
When export tax collection started decreasing, it was rapidly replaced 
by a direct domestic tax and (to a lesser extent) an indirect domestic 
tax. As mentioned earlier, income tax was not a source of government 
revenue; in fact, during the 19th century Chile had no permanent 
income tax law and it wasn’t until 1924 that one was enacted (Law 
3,996). As described by Humud (1974), this law abolished specific 
taxes and imposed new taxes on real estate (9 percent), capital gains 
(4.5 percent), industrial and commercial profits (3.5 percent), mining 
profits (5 percent) and wages and salaries (2 percent).
This change in the structure of the fiscal budget had a significant 
impact on the economy, since the government replaced an “optimal 
tax” (although it is difficult to determine whether it was set at the 
optimal rate; see Lüders and Wagner, 2003c) with a distortionary 
tax scheme. Table 6 illustrates how revenues collected from different 
sources changed over time. The simple model presented in Section 3 
could be modified to introduce a government that makes transfers to 
the private sector that are financed by transfers from abroad via the 
tax on nitrate exports, so the resource constraint given by (2) will be 
modified accordingly. Transfers from abroad abruptly stopped due to 
a negative terms-of-trade shock and the substitution of natural nitrate 
with artificial nitrate. Therefore, in order to finance transfers to the 
private sector, the government levied income taxes, reducing the marginal 
productivity of capital. In a model like this, the new tax structure will 
have a permanent effect on the level of per-capita and per-worker GDP. 
This policy, combined with the change in trade strategy, could explain 
why per-capita GDP did not return to the original trend as shown in 
Panel (b) of Figure 1. Another plausible explanation is that the transitory 
shock of the Great Depression had a permanent effect on the level of 
per-capita GDP, which is consistent with the idea of endogenous growth 
and unit root in the per-capita GDP series. This idea was ruled out 
by the evidence presented in Section 2, which rejected the unit root 171 J.R. Fuentes | A UNIFIED GROWTH MODEL FOR INDEPENDENT CHILE
hypothesis against the alternative of stationarity and structural breaks 
(Zivot and Andrews test). Considering the permanent changes in the 
structure of the taxation scheme and the outward-oriented strategy, 
it is more likely that the economy experienced a permanent impact in 
the level of per-capita GDP, since the growth rate after the break is 
similar to the one in the previous period.
table 6. different sources of taxation








1900-1914  50.5 0.01 35.2 14.3
1915-1920  48.3 5.8 34.2 11.1
1921-1925  24.3 5.3 28.1 42.3
1926-1931  25.3 16.3 39.6 18.9
1932-1939  11.9 15.3 44.7 28.0
1940-1945  17.1 16.2 35.2 31.5
1946-1950 19.8 22.7 38.9 18.6
Source: Based on Díaz et al. (2003).
5.2.  Second structural change: 1971 or 1981
The second structural break took place in the years 1969-1973 for per-
capita GDP and 1979-1983 for per-worker GDP. As described later 
in this paper, between 1973 and 1981 drastic structural reforms were 
implemented. In order to understand this second break, an overview 
of the economic policies of the Chilean government between 1940 and 
1973 is necessary. The most important changes in economic policy 
during 1940-1973, compared to the previous period, are related to 
trade and government intervention (see Meller, 1996).
After the Great Depression, the state expanded its participation in 
economic activity and implemented a new development strategy. Like 
many other countries, Chile embarked on a push for industrialization based 
on an import substitution strategy.
5 The objectives of this strategy were 
to isolate the economy from external volatility and grow its industrial 
base. In the period from 1930 to 1973, increasing trade protections were 
5.  Meller (1996) argues that Chile began following this inward-focused strategy in the 1930s, well before 
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put in place to support the country’s nascent industries. Among other 
mechanisms, the Chilean government introduced exchange rate controls, 
high import tariffs on a large variety of goods, quotas, advance deposit 
requirements for imports, bans on certain imports, and implicit and 
explicit subsidies. As expected, the structure of protective measures 
did not follow a specific strategy, but resulted from the relative power 
of different interest groups lobbying for higher protection. Although 
the share of manufacturing industry output in total GDP increased 
from 11 percent in 1925 to 25 percent in 1973, the industry was highly 
inefficient and incapable of surviving without barriers to trade.
Figure 2 shows that Chile’s outwardly oriented strategy after independence 
increased trade (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP) and 
that after the steep decline in international trade at the time of the 
Great Depression, the openness of the economy essentially experienced 
no change until 1974. An upward trend was observed during the last 
period of analysis, interrupted only by a couple of years during the 
financial crisis of 1982. This trend was mainly explained by an aggressive 
outwardly oriented strategy after 1973 (we will revisit this point later).
figure 2. external openness
(Exports plus imports over GDP)
Source: Díaz et al. (2003).
Another area in which there were important changes during this period 
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state transitioned from promoting private investment through credit 
to the private sector to an entrepreneur state with large state-owned 
enterprises, and finally to a social planning state managing economic 
activity through taxes, subsidies and credit (Meller, 1996). The Allende 
government elected in 1970 deepened this central planning role, nationalizing 
the largest copper mines and taking control of numerous private firms in 
the industrial and banking sectors. By 1972, the contribution of state-
owned enterprises to GDP reached 39%, compared to 14% in 1965. This 
experiment ended suddenly in 1973 with the military coup. Although 
the leaders of the new military government believed the system as it had 
evolved was not working, initially they did not have a specific program 
in mind. After seeking advice from a group of U.S.-trained economists, 
the government began a major reform with the overarching goal of 
moving from a state that was highly involved in economic activity to a 
market-oriented system.
6 The main reforms applied were:
7
■ ■ Price liberalization, including the interest rate. Before 1973, 
the government set the prices of most goods and services in 
the economy, including interest and exchange rates (multiple 
exchange rates existed at that time).
■ ■ The state’s heavy involvement in economic activity came to an 
end. This occurred in several ways. On the one hand there was 
a change in fiscal policy, with fiscal responsibility becoming 
one of the cornerstones of the success of Chile’s economy in 
subsequent years. The government abruptly reduced the fiscal 
deficit. On the other hand, a massive privatization process was 
carried out during the late 1970s and 1980s.
■ ■ Trade and finance liberalization. Import tariffs were cut drastically 
and non-tariff barriers were eliminated. The private sector was 
given access to the international market and a new law was 
enacted to attract foreign direct investment.
■ ■ Reforms in other areas: changes in the Labor Code, reduction of 
union power, replacement of the pay-as-you-go pension system 
with a private system, etc.
Once again, the two most significant reforms were related to the state’s 
role in the economy and the trade regime (Chumacero et al., 2007). 
6.  See Aninat et al. (2004) and Chumacero et al. (2007) for an analysis of the political economy of 
the reforms.
7.  An exhaustive analysis of the reforms can be found in the book edited by Larraín and Vergara (2000).174 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 157–179
When the country returned to democratic rule in 1990, the succeeding 
governments deepened the external orientation of the economy through 
unilateral tariff reductions and free trade agreements with numerous 
partners. The effect of these policies can be seen in Figure 2, which 
shows an upward trend in the measure of openness. The governments 
since 1990 have adhered to a policy of fiscal responsibility, which 
has become one of the central pillars of Chile’s economic success by 
providing macroeconomic stability. As seen in Figure 1, Panel (b), all 
of this caused an acceleration in the growth process and allowed the 
economy to coincide with the long-run trend by 2008. According to 
the theoretical model presented here, the economy should move to a 
new long-run equilibrium with a higher per-capita income level. The 
question is whether this income level will be the one given by the 
long-term trend or higher.
6.  An extended empirical model
Considering that government involvement and trade orientation 
played an important role in explaining the episodes defined by the 
structural changes found in previous sections, it seems necessary to 
modify the univariate model to take that into account. Chumacero 
and Fuentes (2006b) estimate a similar model (for 1960-2000) for a 
group of seven Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay), finding no evidence of 
structural breaks in per-capita GDP after controlling for terms of 
trade and government expenditures over GDP. The one exception 
was Paraguay, which experienced a structural change in 1981. The 
countries in the sample had different growth experiences, but their 
structure has been stable when including these variables. 
More specific to Chile, Chumacero and Fuentes (2006a) develop a 
two-sector neoclassical model that allows for a natural-resource sector, 
which is an endowment, and a productive sector that uses capital and 
labor. In this scenario there is a government that levies taxes on the 
private sector. Government expenditures are composed of lump-sum 
transfers to the private sector plus another portion that is not valued 
by society. These two features allow them to include terms of trade 
and government expenditures in the empirical model. 
A measure of trade openness and government expenditure must 
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important to include terms of trade to control for a proxy of external 
conditions. This variable seems to be important in explaining the 
structural breaks in the 1960-2000 period (Chumacero and Fuentes, 
2006b). The inclusion of these variables is justified in the theoretical 
literature, as control for the steady state equilibrium, but the literature 
is silent about the structure of the lags to be employed. Here we 
use the idea of estimating a general model, which is progressively 
simplified to a more parsimonious structure (general to particular, 
Hendry, 1985). The equation to be estimated is:
τ =++++ AL yaat BLgC LD LT () ln () () () t t t t 01   (8)
where g represents the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, τ is 
the average import tariff and T stands for the log of terms of trade.
8 
A(L), B(L), C(L) and D(L) are polynomial in the lag operator. Two 
lags of each variable are included in the estimation of Equation (8).
table 7. univariate model conditioned by external conditions 
and government expenditures 
1833-2009 per-capita gdp per-worker gdp
Trend (t) 0.003 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001)
Per-capita GDP in t - 1 (log) 0.812 (0.045) 0.957 (0.117)
Per-capita GDP in t - 2 (log) -0.164 (0.134)
Average import tariff in t - 2 -0.186 (0.089) -0.144 (0.72)
Government expenditure/GDP in t - 1 -0.453 (0.162) -0.272 (0.208)
Government expenditure/GDP in t - 2 0.317 (0.253)
Terms of trade (logs) 0.085 (0.038) 0.0361 (0.015)
Terms of trade (logs) in t - 2 (logs) -0.090(0.048)
Constant 1.059 (0.274) 1.103 (0.312)
Long-run growth rate 0.0156 (0.001) 0.0154 (0.001)
Q (p-value) 0.166 0.905
Q2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
JB 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
8.  Government expenditures are proxied by government expenditures in the national accounts. Before 
1940, the series was extended using real government expenditures from the fiscal accounts in Díaz   
et al. (2003). The average import tariff is an estimation of total government revenues from import over 
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The results of estimating Equation (8) are shown in Table 7. The 
coefficients for the trend and lags of per-capita and per-worker 
GDP are similar to those estimated in Section  4, yielding almost 
the same long-run growth rates as those estimated in Table  2. 
The negative coefficient for the government-expenditures-to-GDP 
ratio indicates that an increase in this variable reduces the level 
of per-capita GDP, but it does not have a statistically significant 
effect on per-worker GDP. Trade distortions, measured as the 
implicit import tariff, have a negative impact on both per-worker 
and per-capita GDP. The terms of trade have a positive and then a 
negative effect on per-capita GDP, but, as expected, they have no 
effect in the long run; in the case of per-worker GDP, this effect is 
positive and statistically different from zero. Beyond the value of 
the coefficients, what is important in this analysis is whether the 
inclusion of these variables could eliminate the structural breaks 
in the growth process of the Chilean economy.
The battery of Bai-Perron tests applied to the univariate model are 
applied again to the extended model and show no evidence of a break 
whatsoever. Therefore, fiscal policy and openness to international 
trade explain the structural breaks found in the analysis of 200 years 
of Chile’s economic growth.
7.  concluding remarks
The economic history literature divides Chilean economic history into 
several episodes. This paper contributes to the discussion by providing 
a formal statistical analysis, based on a neoclassical growth model, 
to identify crucial moments in the country’s economic history. These 
crucial moments have been associated with structural breaks in the 
neoclassical model.
A test to endogenously identify the breaks and thus avoid pretesting 
bias was used for the model, with per-capita GDP and per-worker 
GDP as dependent variables. The results of the test indicate that 
1929 was the first break and 1971 and 1981 were the second breaks 
for per-capita GDP and per-worker GDP, respectively. The analysis 
of the three periods defined by these structural changes found that 
internal policies (specifically the role of government, fiscal policies 
and trade policies) and external shocks played a key role in the 
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openness, terms of trade and government expenditures over GDP are 
included in the empirical model, the evidence of structural breaks 
no longer appears.
Additional research should be conducted along these lines to explain 
the country’s historical growth rate. There are at least two questions 
that deserve further research. First, why didn’t per-capita GDP return 
to the level predicted by the original trend after the temporary shock 
of the Great Depression? The hypothesis posed here is that changes in 
the way government financed spending and changes in trade policies 
could explain this. In the former case, the government, due to an 
adverse external situation, switched its main source of financing from 
export taxes to domestic income taxes, which may have had a leveling 
effect in the context of the neoclassical growth model. Regarding 
trade policies, a more inwardly oriented strategy has a leveling effect 
on per-capita income, according to the theoretical model used here.
The second question is: Is this change in the growth trend simply a 
catching-up with the long-term trend or is it a transition to a new 
long-run equilibrium? By 2008, Chile’s per-capita GDP reached its 
original trend. A more optimistic view could be that the Chilean 
economy is moving toward a new equilibrium. More time is needed 
to determine a final answer to this question.178 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 157–179
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